>>> AND IS NOW A FAMILIAR SITE, PRESIDENT TRUMP AT HIS DESK, WIELDING HIS PEN, ISSUING EXECUTIVE ORDERS.

BUT, WHAT EXACTLY ARE THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SIGNING SPREE?

GILLIAN METZGER IS A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROFESSOR AT COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL AND HAS PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND SHE JOINED WALTER ISAACSON NOW TO DECIPHER THE ACTIONS THAT WE HAVE SEEN SO FAR, AND WHAT COMES NEXT.

>> THANK YOU, CHRISTIANE.

AND PROFESSOR GILLIAN METZGER, THANK YOU TO THE SHOW.

>> THANLK FOR HAVING ME.

>> SO, PRESIDENT TRUMP HAS EMBARKED ON SORT OF A WIDE- RANGING ASSAULT, SHUTTING DOWN AGENCIES, AND CUTTING SPENDING.

IT WAS PRETTY MUCH WHAT HE WAS ELECTED TO DO, AND CONGRESS HAS OFFERED NO REAL PUSHBACK.

SO, WHAT IS WRONG WITH WHAT HE IS DOING?

>> WELL, THERE ARE SEVERAL THINGS THAT ARE CONCERNING ABOUT WHAT HE IS DOING.

I THINK WHAT WE ARE SEEING IS A REALLY REMARKABLE EXERTION OF EXECUTIVE POWER.

OUR SYSTEM IS NOT ONE WHERE A PRESIDENT IS SUPPOSED TO BE GOVERNING SINGLE-HANDEDLY.

MANY OF THE ACTIONS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN CERTAINLY APPEAR TO BE ACTING IN THE FACE OF GOVERNING STATUTES.

SOME INSTANCES THAT ALTER THE ALL CONSTITUTION.

SO, I THINK HIS ACTIONS SO FAR DO RAISE SOME PRETTY SERIOUS RULE OF LAW CONCERNS.

>> LET'S GO IN DEFIANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

GIVE ME A COUPLE OF EXAMPLES?

>> WELL, FOR EXAMPLE, HIS EXECUTIVE ORDER ON BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP IS VERY HARD TO CLEAR, TO PUT IT MILDLY, WITH THE 14th AMENDMENT, AND HAS BEEN ENJOINED ALREADY ON THAT BASIS.

SOME OF THE CLAIMS THAT WE MAY SEE AND SOME OF THE ACTIONS ON FUNDING MAY REFLECT A VERY CAPACIOUS VIEW OF THE PRESENT HAVING AN INHERENT POWER TO NOT SPEND WHICH IS NOT A POWER THAT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED, AND IN FACT THE CONSTITUTION VERY STRONGLY GIVES THE POWER OF THE PURSE TO CONGRESS, SO THAT WOULD BE ANOTHER AREA WHERE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS ACTIONS NOT WORKING WITH A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK.

>> LET'S DOLE DOWN ON THAT POWER NOT TO SPEND, WHETHER IT BE SEQUESTERING, ENDOWMENT, OR JUST NOT SPENDING MONEY THAT HAS BEEN APPROPRIATED BY CONGRESS.

THAT SEEMS A SOMEWHAT MURKY -- ALTHOUGH, THERE HAVE BEEN CASES ABOUT IT -- AREA.

TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH SAY, OKAY, THIS IS WASTEFUL MONEY, WE ARE NOT GOING TO SPEND IT?

>> YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT -- THERE IS ACTUALLY A VERY ARTICULATED LEGAL FRAMEWORK THAT GOVERNS SPENDING.

THERE IS, IN THE CONSTITUTION, GRANTING THE SPENDING POWER TO CONGRESS AND ALSO THE APPROPRIATIONS CLAUSE, THAT SAYS THAT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH CANNOT MAKE SPENDING WITHOUT AN APPROPRIATION FROM CONGRESS, THE TWO THINGS THAT REALLY REITERATE WHY CONGRESS IS THE MAIN CONSTITUTIONAL ACTOR.

>> THAT SAYS THAT THEY CAN'T MAKE SPENDING WITHOUT APPROPRIATION, BUT CAN YOU JUST NOT SPEND SOME MONEY THAT HAS BEEN APPROPRIATED, IF THEY THINK IT IS WASTEFUL?

>> SO, WHEN YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT NOT SPENDING, YOU ARE STILL ACTUALLY ACTING IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE, BECAUSE THE STATUTE, THE APPROPRIATIONS STATUTE, GRANTS THE FUNDS, AND IF IT IS A STATUTE THAT DOESN'T GRANT DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW THEY ARE EXPENDED, OR IF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS ACTING IN A WAY THAT IS AT ODDS WITH THAT STATUTE, YOU STILL HAVE A VIOLATION OF CONGRESS' CONTROL OVER FUNDING.

THERE IS ALSO A BACKGROUND STATUTE, WHICH DATES BACK TO 1974.

IT WAS ENACTED IN RESPONSE TO THE LAST PRESIDENT, WHO RAISED THIS KIND OF BROAD ATTACK ON SPENDING, WHICH WAS PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON.

IT IS THE CONTROL ACT OF 1974, AND IT VERY SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICTS THE OCCASIONS ON WHICH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH CAN REFUSE TO SPEND MONEY THAT HAS BEEN APPROPRIATED BY CONGRESS.

>> SO, LET'S SAY HE DOESN'T SPEND MONEY, OR THE BUREAUCRACY DOESN'T, OR THE AGENCY DOESN'T SPEND MONEY.

WHAT IS THE LEGAL RECOURSE?

DOES CONGRESS HAVE TO SUE TO STOP IT?

CAN AN ORDINARY CITIZEN SUIT TO STOP THAT?

>> WELL, WE HAVE FILED A COUPLE OF LAWSUITS ALREADY -- ONE BY A GROUP OF STATES, AND ONE BY A GROUP OF NONPROFITS.

BOTH OF WHICH, WERE AFFECTED BY THE FUNDING FREEZE, IN TERMS OF HAVING FUNDS THAT THEY WERE EXPECTING OR RELYING ON, TAKEN AWAY.

SO, THAT GIVES THEM COME IN THAT SENSE, STANDING.

AND THE CLAIMS THAT THEY HAVE RAISED OUR ATTACKS ON THE ACTION AS BEING ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, BECAUSE THESE ARE LAWSUITS AIMED PARTICULARLY AT THE OMB MEMO IN PART, AND THE LACK OF EXPLANATION IN THAT VERY BRIEF MEMO FOR THIS CATEGORY ACROSS THE BOARD, PAUSE IN FUNDINGS, WHAT THEY ARE TARGETING IS ARBITRARY PURCHASES AND ALSO BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF AUTHORITY ON THE PART OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO JUST PAUSE FUNDING, WHICH AGAIN, CONGRESS HAS REQUIRED.

THERE HAS BEEN SOME -- NO DOUBT, THERE ARE SOME STATUTES THAT ARE AFFECTED BY THE SPENDING CLAUSE, THAT, IN FACT, DO GIVE SOME DISCRETION TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

BUT AGAIN, THE PAUSE AND ACTING IN SUCH A CATEGORICAL AND ACROSS-THE-BOARD WAY, THAT IT REALLY -- YOU CAN'T TIE INTO THE SPECIFIC STATUTES.

IT IS A REAL DEVIATION FROM THE WAY APPROPRIATIONS AND SPENDING HAS BEEN TREATED IN THE PAST.

>> DOES IT MATTER IF CONGRESS -- LET'S SAY IT JUST ROLLS OVER, AS IT SEEMS TO BE DOING AT THE MOMENT?

>> I THINK IT DOES MATTER.

YOU KNOW, YOU CAN DO LAWSUITS, AND LAWSUITS IN THIS CASE, THEY ARE VERY QUICK, TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS PUT IN PLACE.

BUT, YOU KNOW, FUNDAMENTALLY, IT IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE CONGRESS THAT IS DEFENDING ITS CORE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES.

SO FAR, WE REALLY HAVEN'T SEEN THAT, AND WE ARE GOING TO NEED TO SEE IT, IN ORDER TO REALLY ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK.

>> WELL, LET'S GO OVER SOME OF THE SPECIFIC THINGS.

THERE IS USAID, THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN AID, AND HE WANTS TO EITHER DECIMATE IT, OR SHUT IT DOWN, OR ROLL IT INTO THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

IS THAT LEGAL?

>> I DON'T BELIEVE IT IS, FROM WHAT I HAVE SEEN, SO FAR.

THE MOST BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT USAID IS AN AGENCY THAT WAS CREATED BY CONGRESS.

CONGRESS HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CREATE AGENCIES, NOT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

IF CONGRESS CREATES AN AGENCY, THEN IT WILL TAKE ACTION BY CONGRESS TO DE-CREATE AN AGENCY.

THE APPROPRIATIONS STATUTES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 DO ALLOW THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO DO SOME REORGANIZATION, BUT ONLY IF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONSULTS WITH CONGRESS, FIRST, AND ACTUALLY PROHIBITS THE USE OF ANY FUNDS THAT GO TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR USAID FOR A REORGANIZATION, WHERE THERE HASN'T BEEN THAT KIND OF CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS.

SO, THIS ACTION SEEMS TO BE REALLY FLYING IN THE FACE OF THAT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK.

>> LET'S TAKE ANOTHER ONE, WHICH IS THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU.

THAT ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN ROLLED INTO THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT, THE NEW TREASURY SECRETARY IS NOW IN CHARGE, AND HE IS BASICALLY, I WON'T SAY SHUTTING IT DOWN, BUT DISMANTLING IT A LOT.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THAT?

AN EXAMPLE OF ALSO SOMETHING CHUMP RAN ON, SAYING HE WAS GOING TO DO.

>> JUST BECAUSE HE RUNS ON IT, DOESN'T MEAN HE GETS TO DO IT IF IT IS AT ODDS WITH GOVERNING STATUTES.

THAT IS KIND OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT HAS OUTLINED A LOT OF THESE LAWSUITS, NOW TRYING TO ENSURE THAT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTIONS GO FORWARD IN ACCORDANCE WITH GOVERNING STATUTES.

FOR THE CFPB, YOU WANT TO LOOK AT THE STATUTE CREATING THE AGENCY, AND ASSESS WHETHER OR NOT THIS WAS A POWER THAT TREASURY HAD.

THE CFPB WAS INITIALLY CREATED AS AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY WITH VERY STRONG INDEPENDENCE PROTECTIONS, MANY OF WHICH, IT STILL HAS IN TERMS OF, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVING A BUDGET THAT IS INDEPENDENT, AND INDEPENDENTLY FUNDED.

SO, THE QUESTION WOULD BE, IN ALL OF THESE CASES, WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTIONS THAT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS ASSERTING IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT STATUTES AND THAT IS WHAT COURTS ARE LOOKING AT.

>> ALL OF THIS SEEMS PART OF A LARGER DISPUTE, ONE THAT WE KNOW THE SUPREME COURT IS GOING TO HAVE TO RESOLVE ON WHETHER THE EXECUTIVE IS SORT OF UNITARY, AND THAT THE PRESIDENT CAN DO WHATEVER HE WANTS WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

EXPLAINED THAT THEORY, AND THE SENSE YOU HAVE OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH SEEMS TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE SUPPORTIVE OF THAT THEORY THAN PREVIOUS COURTS?

>> YEAH, IT CERTAINLY IS.

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY EMPHASIZES THAT THE EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION IS VESTED IN A PRESIDENT, A SINGLE PRESIDENT, AND EMPHASIZES THAT HE, UNDER THIS THEORY, GETS TO EXERCISE ALL OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER, WHICH IS THEN UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN, NOT SIMPLY SUPERVISE THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY BY ALL OF THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYEES, AND DEPARTMENTS, AND AGENCIES THAT CONGRESS CREATES IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, USING CONGRESS' OWN CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, BUT IT SEEMS THAT THE PRESIDENT SORT OF HAS THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE DECISIONS, AND IN PARTICULAR, TO MOVE OFFICIALS EXERCISING EXECUTIVE POWER.

PARTICULARLY, SO FAR, THE COURT HAS EMPHASIZED THAT AT THE HIGH LEVEL, RIGHT?

SO, WE ARE TALKING, IN PARTICULAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CFPB DIRECTOR OR PRINCIPAL OFFICER IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHO HAS A FIVE-YEAR TERM.

SO, THIS SUPREME COURT HAS TAKEN A BROAD VIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY, AND ASSERTED THIS UNITARY EXECUTIVE, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF CHALLENGES TO REMOVAL RESTRICTIONS.

SO FAR, THE COURT HAS NOT OVERTURNED GOING BACK TO 1935 THAT DOES ALLOW PROTECTIONS FOR A MEMBER HEADED AGENCY, FOR EXAMPLE, OR FOR INFERIOR OFFICERS WHO DO NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT POLICYMAKING AUTHORITY.

>> WELL, GET SPECIFIC ON THAT?

LIKE, IS THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, AND TRUMP FIRED A DEMOCRAT ON IT?

IS THAT WHAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT?

>> RIGHT.

SO, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD COMMISSIONER WOULD BE A PRINCIPAL OFFICER, AND THE QUESTION, IF THAT GOES FORWARD -- AND I BELIEVE A LAWSUIT HAS BEEN FILED -- THE QUESTION THAT WILL BE RAISED IS, THAT IS NOT CAPABLE OF THE GOVERNMENT STATUTE OF REMOVAL PROTECTIONS, AND WHETHER OR NOT THOSE PROTECTIONS INTRUDE ON THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO TAKE CARE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND HIS ABILITY TO REMOVE HIGH- RANKING EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS.

IN ITS RECENT DECISIONS, AGAIN, THE COURT HAS RETAINED THIS EARLIER PRECEDENT THAT ALLOWS LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR MULTIMEMBER BOARDS THAT ARE SORT OF DIVIDED ON PARTISAN GROUNDS, WHETHER OR NOT IT WILL CONCLUDE THAT THE EXERCISES TOO MUCH EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY, OR THAT THE PROTECTIONS AGAINST REMOVAL IN THAT STATUTE ARE TOO GREAT, OR DECIDE TO OVERTURN THAT EARLIER PRESIDENT, IS ONE THINGS THAT THE LITIGATION WILL SHOW.

>> THIS IS PART OF THE LARGER MOVEMENT THAT STARTED WITH THE OVERTURNING OF CHEVRON, WHICH IS WHERE YOU KIND OF DEFER TO AGENCIES, UNELECTED AGENCIES, TO MAKE RULES AND REGULATIONS ABOUT WHAT CONGRESS DOES.

TELL ME HOW THAT FITS INTO, I GUESS, WHAT THE TRUMP PEOPLE WOULD CALL OVERREACH BY THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY AND THEIR DESIRE TO TRIM THAT ABILITY BACK?

>> WHAT CHEVRON BASICALLY SAID IS THAT IF AN AGENCY IS CHARGED WITH IMPLEMENTING A STATUTE, THEN A COURT SHOULD DEFER TO THE AGENCIES' INTERPRETATION OF THE AMBIGUOUS STATUTE, IF THAT INTERPRETATION IS REASONABLE.

AND IN THAT SENSE, YES, IT GAVE AGENCIES DEFERENCE FOR THEIR INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES ON THE GROUNDS THAT CONGRESS HAD IMPLICITLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO THEM BY HAVING THEM BE THE IMPLEMENTOR OF THESE STATUTES.

INTERESTINGLY, WE HAVE A PRESIDENT AND ADMINISTRATION RIGHT NOW THAT ARE MAKING VERY BOLD ASSERTIONS OF EXECUTIVE POWER, AND IN FACT, WHAT WE SEE WITH THE ROBERTS COURT, IS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN PRETTY SKEPTICAL ABOUT SOME OF THESE BROADER ASSERTIONS OF EXECUTIVE POWER, AND IN PARTICULAR, YOU KNOW, IF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IS ASSERTING PARTICULAR VIEWS OF GOVERNING STATUTES, UNDER THE OVERTURNING OF CHEVRON, THEY WILL NO LONGER GET DEFERENCE FOR THOSE VIEWS, SO WHETHER OR NOT THE ROBERTS COURT APPROACH TO AUTHORITY AND ITS ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO REVIEW AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS ENDS UP SITTING WITH THE AGENDA OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION, WHICH WANTS TO ASSERT EXECUTIVE POWER IN ITS OWN RIGHT, IS SOMETHING WE STILL HAVE TO SEE.

>> SO, TOO SIMPLE IF I THAT A BIT, WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IS THAT THE DECISIONS -- WHICH CONSERVATIVES CHEERED -- OF NOT ALLOWING THE AGENCIES TOO MUCH DIFFERENCE WHEN THEY MAKE REGULATIONS, COULD COME BACK, AND HEARD WHAT TRUMP IS TRYING TO DO, WHICH IS LET SOME OF THESE APPOINTEES OF HIS IN THESE AGENCIES SCALE THINGS BACK RADICALLY?

>> YEAH.

I MEAN, BECAUSE AT THE END OF THE DAY, IT IS GOING TO BE COURTS DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT AGENCIES HAVE AUTHORITY TO DO THE ACTIONS THEY WANT TO DO, WITHOUT GIVING THEM DEFERENCE.

CHEVRON WAS ALWAYS A DOCTRINE THAT SERVES THE INTEREST OF THE ADMINISTRATION IN POWER, IN TERMS OF GIVING IT DEFERENCE.

SO, WE WILL SEE WHETHER OR NOT IT COMES BACK TO BITE A LITTLE BIT.

>> I WANT TO TALK ABOUT DOGE, THE SO-CALLED DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED BY TRANSFORMING THE U.S. DIGITAL SERVICE, RUN BY ELON MUSK.

IT HAS BEEN GIVEN A LOT OF ACCESS, INCLUDING TO THE TREASURY PAYMENT SYSTEMS, THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY SAYS.

IS THERE SOMETHING ILLEGAL OR WRONG WITH THAT, IN YOUR OPINION?

>> WELL, I THINK THERE ARE SOME REAL CONCERNS THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED, THERE ARE SOME REAL PRIVACY ACT CONCERNS, THERE ARE SOME REAL CONCERNS ABOUT SORT OF JUST THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY.

THESE ARE SYSTEMS THAT ARE VERY CLOSELY HELD, AND ACCESS TO THEM IS STRINGENTLY LIMITED, SO IT IS CONCERNING, TO THINK THAT THEY ARE BEING MADE OPEN MORE GENERALLY.

THERE HAS BEEN LITIGATION, A LAWSUIT AGAIN FILED, AND THIS IS RAISING THE PRIVACY ACT CHALLENGE TO SOME OF WHAT -- SOME OF THE ACCESS THAT HAS BEEN GRANTED.

>> ELON MUSK HAS BEEN CALLED A "SPECIAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE."

WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?

AND IS HE SUBJECT TO THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES IN GOVERNMENT?

>> SO, SPECIAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ARE A CATEGORY OF EMPLOYEE THAT ARE STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED.

THE CRITICAL FEATURE IS THAT THEY ARE OFFICES OR EMPLOYEES WHOSE TENURE IS EXPECTED TO BE TEMPORARY AND LIMITED TO 130 DAYS OUT OF A 365 DAY PERIOD.

THEY ARE SUBJECT TO MANY OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST REQUIREMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.

THEY HAVE SOME EXEMPTIONS FROM SOME REQUIREMENTS AND THEY MAY NOT NEED TO FILE PUBLICLY ON THE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FRONT.

DEPENDING ON HOW MANY DAYS THEY ARE EMPLOYED.

BUT, THEY ARE SUBJECT TO THOSE RESTRICTIONS.

>> AND WHO IS SUPPOSED TO ENFORCE THOSE RESTRICTIONS?

>> WELL, THOSE ARE RESTRICTIONS THAT ARE GENERALLY ENFORCED, FOR EXAMPLE, BY THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT, AND BY OTHERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION.

>> AND CAN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND PRESIDENT TRUMP HIMSELF DECIDE HOW THOSE WILL BE ENFORCED?

>> AGAIN, A CORE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT IS TO TAKE CARE THAT THE LAW BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED.

AND THAT IS AN OBLIGATION THAT THE PRESIDENT AND LEADERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, HISTORICALLY HAVE TAKEN QUITE SERIOUSLY.

SO, IF A STATUTE REQUIRES DISCLOSURE, THEN I WOULD ASSUME THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD TAKE THAT SERIOUSLY.

>> OVER THE PAST 20 OR 30 YEARS, PRESIDENTS HAVE BEEN USING EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES, AND ORDERS, AND JUST EXPANDING PRESIDENTIAL POWER.

CONGRESS HAS BEEN DEFIANT, THE COURTS HAVE BEEN DEFINED.

HAS THE PRESIDENT HAD THIS MUCH AUTHORITY, EVER BEFORE IN OUR HISTORY?

AND IS THIS A TREND THAT TRUMP IS JUST ACCELERATING?

>> WELL, CERTAINLY, YOU ARE EXACTLY RIGHT, WE ARE ON A PATH TO EXPANDING EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY, IN PART, GIVING SOME OF THE POLITICAL DIVIDES IN THE COUNTRY, AND AS A RESULT, THE DIFFICULTY CONGRESS HAS HAD IN TERMS OF TAKING ON MAJOR ISSUES, AND ENACTING LEGISLATION.

I THINK WHAT WE ARE SEEING WITH THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IS, IN SOME WAYS, THE FOLLOWING ON, AN EXPANSION ON THAT TREND, AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION APPEARS TO BE ACTING IN THE FACE OF GOVERNING STATUTES AND THE FACE OF THE CONSTITUTION IS, I THINK, A DISTINCTIVE TRAIT AND ONE THAT IS PARTICULARLY ALARMING AND WORTH HIGHLIGHTING, BUT THE OVERALL EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR A WHILE.

>> PROFESSOR GILLIAN METZGER, THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR JOINING US.

>> THANKS FOR HAVING ME.